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SPECIESISM AND SEXISM  
 
Emma Munro 
 
 
On a global scale the most exploited humans are women and in factory 
farming the most exploited animals are female. Women are severely 
exploited through the non-recognition of unpaid subsistence activities 
and home-maker services as ‘real work’. By ‘real work’ I mean a fiscally 
responsive operation, within current Western economic systems. 
Consequently, as Marilyn Waring argues, this 'hidden economy' means 
that women are under-counted in the labour forces and their 
contributions are not  recognised in national accounts.1 
 
Similarly, female animals are over-exploited on the basis of their sex.2 
According to Gruen, the egg industry is indicative of abusively 
exploitative farming practices. Egg factory farming generates 
approximately 4.2 billion, that is 95% of all eggs in the United States 
every year. De-beaked hens are confined for 12 to 18 months in  wire 
mesh cages, without room to move around, stretch their wings, or build 
nests.2 In the United States, more than 100 million cows, sows, sheep and 
5 billion chickens, (mostly hens and chicks) are raised and slaughtered 
for food production each year.3 Mechanistic, assembly-line processes, 
designed for efficient, economical and ever increasing production 
dominate the husbandry of these animals.4 The infliction of pain and 
slaughter in the pursuit of profit and technological advancements is 
justified through constructing the experimental subject or farm animal as 
other. Being other means that animals are constructed and interpreted as 
being without desires, interests or feelings. On what basis are they 
judged as without these qualities? Gruen argues that the symbolic 
operation of the categories woman  and animal  satisfy equivalent 
predominantly utilitarian functions in Western patriarchal societies. 
Their similarities are presumed to be natural, which disguises both 
motive and investment of speakers and discourses that construct/ed the 
natural connection. Theoretical and practical correlations between 
woman  and  animal  are manifest in everyday life and in the ideology 
that justifies and preserves their submission to masculine authority.5 
 
For instance, scientific experimentation regarding reproduction has been 
justified on the basis that potential benefits outweigh emotional and 
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physical suffering. The human contraceptive pill can increase the risk of 
blood clots and heart attack.  IUDs can induce haemorrhages and bring 
about infertility. Hormonal treatment has uncalculated short and long 
term effects. Surgical intervention and manipulation with the risks of 
anaesthetisation and infection are all ‘justifiable risks’. How is it that the 
failure rate of contraceptive technologies has contributed to the infertility 
that reproductive technologies are designed to address? The basis for 
justifying these technologies provides the answer.  
 
A fundamental basis that justifies this way of thinking is derived from 
traditional Western philosophy. The systematic connections inherent in 
the dichotomisation of subject/other, polarises man/woman, 
nature/culture and human animal/non-human animal. This polarisation 
situates woman  and animal in a secondary, subordinate and 
discriminated  location - in relation to man. Dichotomisation is not 
derived from essential biological properties, it is a learned mode of 
thinking, perceiving and knowing that transforms reality into static, 
oppositional and hierarchical conceptual categories. These conceptual 
categories are confined to the manifestation of specific ideas and images 
in regard to subjectivity and identity. It is the constructed categories of 
subjectivity and identity that are the focus of racism, sexism and 
speciesism.  
 
The connection between categories of subjectivity and identity  is neither 
random nor natural. Inherent to Cartesian dualism is the disassociation of 
mind from body6 and the connection of mind with culture and man.  This 
network of connections excludes any being that is not cultured, white, 
middle (or upper) class, Western and a citizen. Women, animals, people 
of other races are all necessarily excluded. Descartes orchestrated a 
network of strategic connections that systematically excluded woman - 
regardless of whether this was his intent, it was a consequence. The 
exclusion of woman was based on her constructed and assumed 
association with nature7 and the body. My argument is that the exclusion 
of woman  is connected to other forms of exclusion. Cartesian 
epistemological paradigms provide a basis with which to justify the 
exclusionary concepts of racism, sexism and speciesism. 
 
Cartesianism is based on the polarisation of terms. It posits the 
privileged designation of positive for one term (in this context: subject, 
man and human). The privileged classification is dependent on the 
 58 
negation or oppression and, or, suppression of its opposite term (other, 
woman and animal). This necessary relationship is one of determined 
advantage or disadvantage. This relationship is central to speciesism and 
sexism, and it is a primary reason for the indefensibility of speciesism. 
Another reason is that while the consequences of negation, oppression or 
suppression are visible the strategic connections that inform these 
processes are invisible. Debates about abortion, reproductive technology 
and  the availability of contraception for women - in both Western and 
non-Western cultures - provide an example of the binary of 
visibility/invisibility. Denial of these services and technologies is 
arguably a visible form of oppression, but the processes that inform the 
politicisation of females as a producer of progeny, food, sexual desire 
and so on are invisible. ‘Natural’ vocation, economic rationality, beauty 
and religious faith are indicative of some of the beliefs and processes 
used to justify mandates on reproductive technology. Economic 
rationalism is exemplified in the following: 'The dual aims of veal 
production are firstly, to produce a calf of the greatest weight in the 
shortest possible time and secondly, to keep its meat as light coloured as 
possible to fulfil the consumers requirement. All at a profit 
commensurate to the risk and investment involved.8  The same processes  
of economic rationality are used to justify a variety of discriminatory 
treatments from the immobilisation and over-feeding of veal calves to 
negating the value of ‘women’s work’ because it would unbalance the 
national economy. None of these terms are isolated, objective, neutral 
concepts. Each term has a complex history of associations that 
predetermine specific responses. 
 
Arguing that each term has a complex history of associations and 
consequences is best explained according to Foucauldian theory.  For 
Foucault, social formations - in combination with his classificatory 
systems of thought - are the current aftermath of former struggles.  These 
classificatory systems are rendered invisible through processes of 
naturalisation.9 In other words interpretation of the networks that link 
exceptions and qualifications to normative evaluative classificatory 
systems is required. The rendering invisible of classificatory systems of 
thought means that deconstruction of these processes of naturalisation 
can be used to reveal ‘invisible’ organising elements and principles. The 
implicit messages encoded within the concepts of speciesism  and  
sexism  can be rendered visible because systems of knowledge are 
predicated on invisible organising terms, that is, categories of 
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knowledges.  Decoding is possible partly because classificatory systems 
of thought are not atemporal, ahistorical  and continual. They are subject 
to socio-political and economic struggle.  This means that the occurrence 
of changes may render obvious previously invisible organising elements 
within systems of knowledges. 
 
Foucault would argue that the intimate reciprocal associations between 
related concepts in dualisms (for example woman, animal, natural, 
manipulable ) create subordinated, habituated, docile bodies that are 
brought closer to an idealised standard. Processes of reciprocity, 
elementary to dualist concepts, instigate the automatic and perpetual 
functioning of distinctions based on concepts of ‘normality’, 
‘abnormality’, race, sex  and species.  For instance, idealised notions of 
‘femininity’ require specific repetitive practices.10 Romanticised 
versions of animal behaviour illustrate how culturally generated 
representations of subjectivity assume the validity of ‘truthfulness’ when 
they are in accord with publicly predetermined notions of ‘who we are’ 
and ‘who or what they are’.The pastoral image of a dairy cow wandering 
around a lush green pasture - featuring in butter and milk advertisements 
- is an example of a romanticised version of reality. The industrialisation 
of the dairy business means an intense five year cycle of pregnancy and 
hyperlactaction, after which the dairy cow is slaughtered. Mastitis, 
infected teats and internal cannibalisation of body tissue are common 
effects of dairy industrialisation.11 The mediatory process involved in 
feminising woman and romanticising animals indicates the gradual and 
cumulative objectification of woman  and animal.  
 
Objectification is achieved through the formation of specific knowledges 
by discourses of power. These formulated knowledges have the effect of 
dictating desired and non-desired characteristics thereby classifying a 
specific norm as preferential. The racial norm of whiteness is perhaps the 
most common and one of the most exclusive normative characteristics 
preferred by Caucasian Western cultures. Race, education, location and 
communicative abilities, to name a few qualifying characteristics, can 
automatically deny or warrant membership to the preferred norm. When 
certain characteristics are privileged and combined they reinforce each 
other in a circular process, multiplying their individual effects. These 
circular processes, which are  intersubjective and interactive, produce the 
appearance of normality, a major consequence of which is invisibility. 
The invisibility of circular processes means the processes that produce 
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norms are themselves unapparent, so it is difference that is remarked on 
and set apart.  In other words the absence of difference represents a 
privileged condition. In this way psychical characteristics are connected 
to anatomical features in a determining manner that facilitates the 
categorisation of a living being into a type, a species. Even though 
animal  and  woman may appear to be totally disparate concepts,  their 
categorisation as other is a parallel that identifies their mutual relations.  
 
Categorisation as other is processed through discourses of power.   
Inclusion within the category of other  is influenced by motive and 
investment. For example, investment and authority is evident in the 
following explicit, supposedly guiltless, admission of cruelty. They hate 
it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could probably do without 
tail-docking if we gave them more room, because they don’t get so crazy 
and mean when they have more space. With enough room, they’re 
actually quite nice animals. But we can’t afford it. These buildings cost a 
lot.' A  non-speciesist discourse would not justify death from porcine 
stress syndrome because it 'in no way nullify[s] the extra return obtained 
from the higher total output'.12 
 
The relationship of the subject13 to the power/knowledge network, and 
therefore the motive and investment of the subject,  must be established. 
Though he did not suggest this, a Foucauldian genealogy of connections 
can be used to make visible the connections between the supposedly 
disparate concepts of speciesism and sexism thereby manifesting the 
active and systematic processes of participation and motivation. Both 
these processes are fundamental to producing coherent  knowledges; in 
other words, to make visible, and thereby accountable specific discourses 
and speakers who/that have the power to construct, categorise and 
determine meaning  and  to conceal their investments while doing so. 
 
It is the sexed and embodied subject (for example, the pig-farmer)  who 
experiences and practises the ideas that guarantee the connection 
between knowledge and practice.14 Open declaration of intent and 
context by the speaker of discourse may alleviate the deception inherent 
in the existing (Western) power/knowledge networks. However, it does 
not explain either how or why porcine stress syndrome can be an 
acceptable factor in the pork industry. I agree with Althusser’s assertion, 
that the way in which we understand the experience of ourselves (such as 
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our subjecthood)  is directly related to pre-determined constructions of 
social categories within specific ideological frameworks.15 
 
For Althusser, the concrete existence of ideology16 is manifested in 
systems of belief, (dead meat is necessary to human health) everyday 
practices (tail-docking, debeaking), institutions (agribusinesses, 
supermarkets) and social structures (economic rationality justifies 
abusive farming practices) which function to rationalise and justify 
widespread values (animal value is judged according to use) and 
conventions (animals don’t feel pain). These systems have the potential 
to render invisible or distort the real operations of power.17 This means 
that ideology produces, or interpellates individuals as historically and 
culturally specific subjects.18 The concepts of sexism  and speciesism 
transform the concrete existence of women and animals and reconstruct 
them as part of the social totality, partly because woman and animal, 
historically, represent a category, a social relation, not an individual. By 
which I mean the actuality of woman  and animal in real, material social, 
political and environmental discourses do not get translated into the 
social anthropocentric constructed totality. Althusser demonstrates that 
categories of thought  (sexuality, race, animality, identity and 
subjecthood) need to be historically and culturally contextualized, to 
prevent uncritical acceptance, and to render visible the investments of 
ideological and power relations.19 
 
This is evident in the way increasingly varied types of animal research 
are revealing different forms of social relations, tool making, and 
communication amongst animals. Cooperative hunting through division 
of labour and coordinative signalling by Aplomado falcons20 is one 
example of animal social relationships. Another is the manipulation by  
beaver family units of their local environment.21 Tool use can be 
demonstrated by the sea otters use of stones to hammer loose molluscs 
and abalones.22 A good example of animal communication as a two-way 
process is provided by the semantic alarm calls of vervet monkeys that 
indicate different types of danger and clearly generate specific responses 
depending on whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or python.23 
 
These diverse characteristics (social relations, tool making, and 
communication), previously the domain of the exclusively ‘cultured’ are 
not correspondingly represented in our treatment, relationship or attitude 
to animals. Similarly, women are increasingly diversifying in social and 
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political arenas, but this is also under represented in our systems of 
social knowledges. 
 
With the help of theoreticians like Foucault and Althusser, it is possible 
to argue that systems of knowledges, discourses and concepts 
interconnect. Therefore, we can expose weak links, or generate 
alternative pathways. One could produce  counter practices, counter 
strategies and counter discourses in an effort to re-direct the existing 
strategies of power and ideology at a local and conjunctural level, rather 
than simply trying to eliminate them. Both a rationalist and an empiricist 
view would reject Foucault’s genealogy as a method of producing 
knowledge because it does not  prove continuity between historical 
events, nor does it focus on origins or causal relationships and so cannot 
produce essential singular truths. 
 
Deconstructionism, however, provides the opportunity to acknowledge 
and describe without recreating conceptual oppositions. 
Deconstructionists claim that meaning and interpretation are produced 
through the artificial and constructed contrasts of dichotomous terms. 
Derridaen deconstructionism argues that analysis of the marginalised 
dichotomous concept and the characteristics of its exclusion, prove that  
the privileged concept derives its meaning and pre-eminence through the 
contrast and suppression of the marginalised concept.24 Therefore the 
privileged concept does not achieve either unmitigated identity or 
conceptual absoluteness; instead its parasitic and contaminatory nature 
becomes evident. Deconstructionism could provide a new and positive 
discourse of the body and of  the subject, which would be socially and 
historically contextual and non-dualistic in its approach. This would be 
possible because the unity, continuity and coherence of the body and the 
subject can be shown to have no natural biological pre-determined basis. 
Deconstruction argues that natural biological pre-determination is an 
effect of traditional discourses of knowledge. If speciesism is seen to be 
an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge then speciesism is a 
constructed and pre-meditated position. It follows that a constructed 
position can be broken down into its constitutive elements and its 
foundational networks of bias and profit made visible. 
 
Systematic networks of bias and profit are paralleled within the 
construction of sexism. It is not difficult to find feminist criticism25 
which is directed against  defining woman on the basis of her body. 
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Biologically determined paradigms rationalise objectification and 
utilisation of woman (as property) solely on the basis of what she can 
produce for man. This last point is equally true for female animals.26 In 
response, a  proponent of factory farming might argue that it is the 
female animals’ biological reproductive characteristics which dictate 
their predominance in ‘modern’ farming practices: 'The modern layer is, 
after all, only a very efficient converting machine, changing the raw 
material - feeding stuffs - into the finished product - the egg - less, of 
course, maintenance requirements.'27 This quote, from a farm industry 
trade journal, wherein one might expect to find the most favourable  
accounts of the farming industry, demonstrates the Cartesian 
interpretation of body as machine . The attitude expressed in this quote is 
not dissimilar to descriptions of the female uterus as  a ‘vessel’  or 
‘storage space’ passively receptive to the ‘active’ male seed. These 
similarities correlate  with the Western historical tradition which 
conceptualises the body as a machine. 'Thus I may consider the human 
body as a machine, fitted together and made up of bones, sinews, 
muscles, veins, blood and skin in such way that, even if there were no 
mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do 
not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind'.28 
Inherent to the concept of body as machine are assumptions that help 
explain the parallel treatment of female humans and female animals. The 
most common assumption about machines  is their specific functionality 
added to which is the value, use and productivity that can be gained from 
the possession of the machine. Fundamental to the concept of body as 
machine is Descartes' disassociation of mind and body.  I am not that set 
of limbs called the human body. For Descartes  the mind (or 
consciousness)  is unextended and indivisible, while the body (or matter) 
is both extended and divisible.29 When this divisibility is applied to 
animals, it supports their exploitation because fundamental to 
Cartesianism is the pre-eminent value of mind (and soul) and the 
subjugation of body to the mind. In the context of animals this translates 
as the subjugation and expendability of animals to the interests of man. 
This ‘rationalisation’ denies an inherent value of animals in themselves, 
to each other and in relation to the ecosystem. Values which, a non-
anthropocentric viewpoint might argue could outweigh the needs and 
wants of man and justify a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship 
between humans and animals. 
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Human-animal relations are widespread, diverse and longstanding as 
indicated by Native American names such as Running Deer and 
Hawkeye,30 Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs featuring human-animal 
hybrid gods, seeing-eye-dogs and patents that have been taken out on 
genetically  altered pigs with a human immune system.31 These human-
animal relationships, indicate that crossing the human-animal divide is 
considered justifiable if it is  to human advantage.  A contradiction exists 
in the sometime separation and at other times combination of human and 
animal. We separate and  hierarchise our relationships on the basis of 
difference and at the same time cite our mutual compatibility as the basis 
for combining human with animal. For example, consider the 
relationship between owner and domestic pet; farmer and commercial 
product; and animal donor organs and human health. In these cases 
human and animal subjectivity is a flexible, manipulable construct. The 
relationships between types of discrimination and prejudice are mutually 
supportive and  may be seen in the way the human-animal hierarchy is 
used to confirm racist human-human hierarchies. The stereotypical 
representation of non-caucasians as ‘blacks’ originates from falsely 
constructed stereotypes about animals. They set up ‘black’ and ‘beastly’ 
as exact synonyms, evidenced in the following book title: The Negro: A 
Beast..32 Humans distinguish ourselves from all non-human animals on 
the basis that we are superior, mentally, genetically, socially and 
spiritually. These distinctions are thought to exist, even though humans 
are genetically and behaviourally closer to primates, than primates are to 
amphibians.  Unless it is to human advantage, we disregard animal 
welfare, intelligence and wellbeing because we maintain a hierarchical 
paradigm that stipulates a superior/inferior divide. 
 
As Midgley argues, speciesism presupposes a massive, hierarchised 
distinction between humans and non-humans.33 This distinction 
determines how we define and practice morality and it determines how 
we judge the importance, utility and value of any non-human. 'Degrees 
of capacity on either side of  the human species-barrier are not allowed 
to affect this sharp divide.'34 Importance, utility and value are decided 
and classified  in terms of human benefit and advantage. Value is judged 
only in human terms. Vivisectionists argue for continual animal 
experimentation on the grounds of human to animal similarities. At the 
same time, they contrarily claim an uncrossable divide between humans 
and non-humans.  
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This divide justifies treatment of non-humans that is considered cruelly 
untenable for humans.35 The well-being and well-fare of the non-human 
is inconsequential in comparison to the privilege and preference 
accorded to humanness; 'animals used in biomedical research should not 
be considered as mere animals but rather as standardised biological 
research tools'.36 The implicit construction is that, after all, tools are for 
human use, advantage and profit. This perspective is completely 
anthropocentric: it is the elevation of humans as superior to animals 
regardless of context.  There is no context left for the needs and well-
being of animals to be considered in preference to humans. Extinction of 
an entire species is possible on these terms.  Nor is speciesism limited by 
time, geography or culture. For instance, the expanding human 
population in the Mediterranean reduced animal habitats and 
extinguished lions and leopards by 200BC in Greece and Asia Minor.  
The last pair of Auks (a flightless seabird) were killed in 1844 in Iceland. 
On Mauritius, the ground nesting dodo was extinct by 1681. The North 
American passenger pigeon thought to have numbered about 5 billion 
was hunted to extinction  between 1630 and 1914.  One animal species 
every four years became extinct between 1600-1900. By  the 1970’s 
about 1000 animal species were made extinct each year. It is estimated 
that 20 percent of the worlds animal and plant species will be extinct 
before 2000.37 This version of human superiority justifies cruel and 
abusive practices towards animals in the pursuit of knowledge and profit. 
Speciesist practices are maintained through ignorance, isolation, 
legislation and secrecy which protect agricultural industries and research 
institutions from a critical and punitive public scrutiny. 38 
 
Anthropocentric thought requires animals to conform to human standards 
of intelligence and communication, if we are to extend to them human 
rights and inherent value. I find anthropocentricity problematic on two 
counts, firstly because it does not recognise or accommodate non-human 
standards of intelligence, communication, rights and value.  Secondly it 
establishes a singular standard for human rights and human values which 
are pre-eminent, universal and absolute. These characteristics exclude 
possibilities for change, difference and alterity - amongst humans, let 
alone recognising the possibility for parallel or concurrent rights, values 
and intelligences by other species. This perspective maintains that 
animals lack the ability to think, to emote or to consider consequences, 
supporting the presumption that humans are superior. It continues, 
contrary to current research into non-human behaviour and cognition. 
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Herman’s39 bottle nose dolphin experiments indicate, amongst other 
things: understanding of word order, observational learning, self-training 
and the refusal to respond to nonsense commands. Given these and other 
empirically validated examples it seems advisable to dispute the 
human/animal divide and to examine what humans regard as 
communication and understanding and the capacity to abstract. 
Regan and Singer reproduce the idea that rationality and the capacity to 
abstract are essential qualities and so they indirectly support speciesism. 
My reasons for this claim are twofold. Firstly, their dual focus on 
rationality reproduces a biased, normative,  hierarchical reason/emotion 
dichotomy. Secondly, if abstraction is the basis for speciesism then the 
consequences of speciesism are distanced to the point of virtual 
ineffectuality. The separation  and distancing of theory and practice is 
self-defeating and self-perpetuating. Considering speciesism outside of 
its practical application removes responsibility to act, or change, through 
disassociation of the self from speciesist practices. 
I have argued that the theory and practice of speciesism are 
interdependent. By which I mean the justification for abusive factory 
farming practices is derived from the belief that animals are inferior to 
humans.  It places the onus of proof on the animal or on the human to 
prove otherwise. 
Why do all non-human animals have to compete with human animals in 
a contest for equality? As Midgley argues, the idea that moral agents 
represent a chosen archetype and interact within a contractual circle of 
morality on an equal basis is self-defeating.40 The notion that all moral 
agents must be of a certain type implies circumscribed boundaries. These 
boundaries exclude or deny moral agency to any being that does not 
comply with pre-determined qualities. Rather the onus should be on 
those (human animals) who have the authority and power to extend 
respect and kindness. If a reciprocal arrangement is required, then it can 
be justified on the basis of what associated species can contribute to 
human welfare and well-being. 
I do not know, however, whether I would go so far as to suggest that this 
be our Kantian duty. Kant’s notion of duty includes the polarisation of 
duty and inclination, and the inherent valuation of intent as of greater 
significance than the consequences of the act.41 Instead I lean towards 
Hegel’s moral consequentialism which stipulates consequences must be 
taken into account.42 For Hegel, rational (social, economic, legal, 
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occupational and political) institutions form a system that is 
paradigmatic of objective ethical life. In turn, the individual is 
predisposed to behave in accordance with norms and conventions 
proposed by those rational social (etc)institutions.43 Hegel would deny 
moral rights and moral acts to animals because they lack rationality and 
freedom. However, his idea that the nature of a moral action must 
include any unintentional or unforseen consequences that develop 
condemns the maltreatment of animals by factory farmer, and researcher 
as immoral - even if they believe in the greater good or the inability of 
animals to experience pain. It follows that what is expected of each 
individual is context dependent, which means that motive and intent are 
context dependent. 
 
Benton’s position is context dependent. He rejects Regan’s distinctions 
between types of moral patients and rejects Singer’s theory because it is 
too difficult to weigh up different types of pleasure and pain. He argues 
that human animals and non-human animals are all embedded within 
ecological niches. We cannot abstract individuals from their 
embededness because it can lead to misguided actions. For Benton the 
individual is indissolubly bound up in their social and ecological 
position, relationships and conditions of life. Benton argues that focusing 
on, or isolating, specific characteristics or qualities such as a ‘rationality’ 
or ‘emotion’ results is an incomplete solution. Human-animal and non-
human-animal embededness must be considered in their own particular 
contexts and relationships. Social relations are not necessarily species 
specific consider, for example,  the ownership of a pet kitten by the 
gorilla Koko.44 This was a relationship which defies commonly accepted 
boundaries for friendship and ownership. Furthermore, the satisfaction of 
need is essential for survival and well being of individuals. Benton is 
aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between genuine and superficial 
needs however he does not give any clear criteria for deciding between a 
conflict of needs. This is problematic because needs are Benton’s basis 
for morally valid claims.45 For Benton  both human animals and non-
human animals can be in relationships and therefore can be moral 
agents.. Accordingly, a moral claim which meets the needs of humans at 
the expense of animals could be presented using Benton’s moral 
paradigm.  
 
The exclusionism and denigration inherent to racism and sexism has a 
custom-made feel to it, limiting the scope of rights and moral agency.  to 
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particular kinds of subjects. The non-included subjects are denied and 
excluded by definition, simply because they are not white men.46 
Humans comprise one species, that is, one biological classification. 
Racism and sexism, referring as they do to human-to-human interaction 
on a cultural or (biological) sex difference are defined and reproduced in 
human terms, therefore they are in a sense restricted to a human context. 
This is not to say that the consequences of racism are determined solely 
by race. As I argued previously (when discussing the dichotomous 
aspects of these terms) the concepts of racism and sexism do not operate 
alone, they materialise historical and contemporary beliefs and bias. 
Speciesism covers a broader area than the concepts of racism and 
sexism. It relates to  the immense scale of difference between humans 
and non-human animals. It is a classic example of anthropocentric 
thinking which blends  the multiple, complex, varied possibilities in the 
animal macrocosmos into a single category: animal, specifically a non-
human animal. The relative homogeneity of human habitats in 
comparison to the heterogeneity of non-human-animal habitat 
requirements should be enough to recognise that the anthropocentric 
nature of the term 'speciesism' renders it invalid and indefensible as a 
position. 
 
Unfortunately, most people would not consider it an adequate rebuttal to 
speciesism. This is because discourses of power are not disembodied 
structures that simply produce knowledge and meaning. Each concept 
must be located and contextualised because it is not an isolated 
neutrality. If we argue that each individual does not create their own 
knowledges and truth then meaning is the property and product of the 
social community. However this is not to say that knowledge is 
disconnected from speakers and discourse, instead it is to say that 
knowledge is not independent of theory and subjectivity. It follows that 
acknowledging that subjectivity is constructed is required to balance the 
alleged guaranty and intellectual appeal of knowledge.  
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